State Lending of Credit—New Analysis of State Constitutional Prohibitions—Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority v. Gardner, 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985) by Hunting, Carol Sue
Washington Law Review 
Volume 61 Number 1 
1-1-1986 
State Lending of Credit—New Analysis of State Constitutional 
Prohibitions—Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority v. 
Gardner, 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985) 
Carol Sue Hunting 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carol S. Hunting, Recent Developments, State Lending of Credit—New Analysis of State Constitutional 
Prohibitions—Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority v. Gardner, 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 
(1985), 61 Wash. L. Rev. 263 (1986). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol61/iss1/11 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
STATE LENDING OF CREDIT-NEW ANALYSIS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS-Washington Higher
Education Facilities Authority v. Gardner, 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d
1240 (1985)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority (WHEFA) v.
Gardner, I the Washington Supreme Court held that the issuance of non-
recourse bonds by WHEFA to finance building construction at private
higher education institutions was permissible under article 8, section 5 of
the Washington Constitution. 2 The opinion rectifies earlier contrary deci-
sions 3 by making clear that the issuance of nonrecourse bonds is not
constitutionally prohibited. 4 The court, however, in reaching this con-
clusion, adopted a new literal interpretation of the constitutional language,
which may restrict the court's future analysis of lending of credit issues by
unnecessarily precluding policy considerations. 5 Although the court's
analysis adequately supported its conclusion in WHEFA, in future cases the
court should continue to consider additional extenuating policy factors
regarding public purpose and retention of public control utilized in other
recent opinions 6 but not specifically included in the express language of the
constitution.
II. BACKGROUND
Article 8, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides, "[t]he
credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of,
any individual, association, company or corporation." 7 A similar provi-
sion, article 8, section 7, applies more expansive prohibitions to lesser
governmental entities:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any
money, or property, or loan its money or credit to or in aid of any individual,
1. 103 Wn. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985).
2. Id. at 847, 699 P.2d at 1245.
3. Washington State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wn. 2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983);
Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wn. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980); Port of
Longview v. Taxpayers of Longview, 85 Wn. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 129 (1974). See infra notes 15-31 and
accompanying text.
4. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 847, 699 P.2d at 1245.
5. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
7. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
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association, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm .... "8
The case history of these constitutional provisions has been the subject of
much scholarly commentary. 9 The provisions were part of the original text
of the Washington Constitution' 0 and were intended by the framers to
prevent the harmful "effects on the public purse of granting public sub-
sidies to private commercial enterprises, primarily railroads," I I where the
public had little control of the marketing of the bonds, or the construction
or management of the facilities. 12
A significant development in interpretation occurred when the court
decided that despite obvious differences in language, section 5 and section
7 were to be interpreted identically, resulting in a major expansion of the
terms of section 5.13 Although section 7 applies only to lesser governmental
units, the court nevertheless extended its prohibitions and exemptions to
the State by incorporating them into section 5.14
8. Id., § 7. Section 7 also prohibits these governmental units from becoming "directly or
indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation." Id. This
prohibition is extended to the State in WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 9: "[t]he state shall not in any manner
loan its credit, nor shall it subscribe to, or be interested in the stock of any company, association or
corporation."
9. See C. KIPPEN, ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 5 AND 7: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROVISIONS, THEIR
IMPACT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE (1979); Reich, Lending of Credit Reinterpreted: New Oppor-
tunitiesfor Public and Private Sector Cooperation, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 639 (1984); Spitzer, An Analytical
View of Recent "Lending of Credit" Decisions in Washington State, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 195
(1985); Note, State Constitution-Debt Limitations-Municipality's Issuance of Revenue Bonds to
Finance Private Pollution Control Facilities Violates State Constitution, 50 WASH. L. REV. 440 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Note, State Constitution].
10. See generally JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 675,
679-84 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
11. City of Marysville v. State, 101 Wn. 2d 50, 55,676 P.2d 989,992 (1984); see also Reich, supra
note 9, at 641 (articles 5 and 7 were designed to prevent "excessive subsidies provided to railroads in the
late nineteenth century"). For a discussion of the history of these provisions and similar provisions in
other constitutions, see Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1963); Comment, State Constitutional
Limitations on a Municipality's Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and
Associations, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (1959); Note, State Constitution, supra note 9, at 446-47.
12. Reich, supra note 9, at 642.
13. Morgan v. Department of Social Sec., 14 Wn. 2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
14. Id.; WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7. Section 7 prohibits direct gifts of money or property, and
loans of money or credit. It also contains an exemption for expenditures for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm. See generally C. KIPPEN, supra note 9, at I-Il.
The court has frequently reiterated this interpretation in recent years. See WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at
845, 699 P.2d at 1244; In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d 255,261 n. 1,634 P.2d 877, 880 n. 1 (1981);
Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wn. 2d 108, 115, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980). But
see infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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A "period of uncertainty"15 in the analysis of sections 5 and 7 began
with Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of Longview, 16 when the court first
addressed the constitutionality of nonrecourse bonds. The decision greatly
expanded the definition of "credit" in order to bring the proposed non-
recourse bonds within section 5.17 The court stated that any benefit con-
ferred by a governmental entity, including "[t]he loan of its name. . . to
bring about a benefit to a private project, even though general liability does
not exist, is nothing short of a loan of its credit."' 18
The court later followed and extended this already broad definition of
"credit" in Washington Health Care Facilities Authority v. Ray, which also
involved nonrecourse bonds. 19 In Ray, the court held that "a state or
municipal corporation lends its credit whenever it allows its unique govern-
mental status or authority to be utilized for the purpose of enabling a private
corporation or individual to obtain property or money that it could not
otherwise acquire for the same price. ",2 0 The court only managed to find the
scheme at issue permissible by utilizing the "poor and infirm" exception
which the court found had been incorporated into section 5 from the
language of section 7.21
The court reversed the trend of broadly construing the definition of credit
in In re Marriage of Johnson,22 decided only one year after Ray. In
Johnson, the court held that state expenditure to enforce payment of child
support did not violate section 5.23 The plurality opinion stated that the
state expenditure was in furtherance of a "recognized governmental func-
tion." 24 The court found such an exception necessary despite the lack of
any textual support; otherwise, the application of section 5 to governmental
programs "would destroy the efficiency of the agencies established by the
constitution to carry out the recognized and essential powers of govern-
ment. It cannot be conceived that the people who framed and adopted the
constitution had such consequences in view. "25 The plurality also noted
15. Reich, supra note 9, at 647.
16. 85 Wn. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1974).
17. For a discussion of the extenuating factual circumstances in the Port of Longview decision that
may have influenced the court in that case to reach a result-oriented conclusion, see Reich, supra note 9,
at 648-49; and Note, State Constitution, supra note 9, at 468-72.
18. Port ofLongview, 85 Wn. 2d at227, 527 P.2d263, 269 (quoting fromState exrelBeckv. York,
164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957)).
19. 93 Wn. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980).
20. Id. at 113, 605 P.2d at 1263.
21. Id. at 115, 605 P.2d at 1264.
22. 96 Wn. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
23. Id. at 267-68, 634 P.2d at 884.
24. Id. at 261, 264, 634 P.2d at 881, 882.
25. Id. at 262, 634 P.2d at 881 (quoting Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568,-575, 48 P. 253, 255
(1897)).
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that the State retained full control of the use of the funds and of the extent of
state liability.26 The plurality also announced in dicta that no lending of
credit would be found where there was no risk of loss of state funds. Risk of
loss was defined in the traditional borrower-lender sense as a state assump-
tion of the obligations of private parties, unlike the expansive definition
created in Port of Longview.27
Recently, the court continued the new approach by holding that non-
recourse bonds issued to help finance home mortgages were permissible
under section 5.28 In Washington State Housing Finance Commission v.
O'Brien, 29 however, the court failed to conclude expressly that nonrecourse
bonds do not constitute a loan of credit, but instead reviewed a variety of
factors: presence of safeguards that retain public control, legitimacy of the
public purpose, lack of risk of loss, and adequacy of consideration for the
benefit conferred. 30 In doing so, the court greatly confused the analysis of
section 5 issues by failing to indicate which factors were essential to its
determination that section 5 was not violated. 31
The final decision of importance prior to WHEFA was City of Marysville
v. State,32 in which the court, following the reasoning of Johnson, held that
the importance of the "legitimate public purpose" to be served may
validate a scheme which would otherwise violate the constitutional pro-
hibitions. 33 The court implicitly overruled the overbroad definitions of
"credit" found in Port of Longview and Ray. 34 The Marysville opinion,
however, did not involve nonrecourse bonds. 35 It was not until the WHEFA
26. Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d at 268, 634 P.2d at 884.
27. Id. at 267, 634 P.2d at 883.
28. Washington State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wn. 2d 491,493,671 P.2d 247, 248
(1983).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 497-99, 671 P.2d at 250-52.
31. As one commentator noted, the O'Brien case "analyzed the facts of the case as if state funds
were being used. The court thus arguably affirmed sub silentio that part of its Ray decision that had
broadened the definition of 'credit' beyond the historical notion of a correllative [sic] of debt .... The
central problem of the O'Brien case and its holding is that it is difficult to apply." Reich, supra note 9, at
657.
32. 101 Wn. 2d 50, 676 P.2d 989 (1984).
33. Id. at 57, 676 P.2d at 993.
34. Id. at 52, 676 P.2d at 990. The statement in Marysville acquires added significance from the
fact that it was written by Justice Utter, who had authored both Port of Longviewv and Ray. See Reich,
supra note 9, at 653.
The dissent in WHEFA based its argument in part on Ray. In light of the questionable precedential
value of the case, the reliance upon Ray by the dissent in WHEFA only weakened its arguments.
WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 851, 699 P.2d at 1247 (Goodloe, J., dissenting).
35. The Marysville opinion involved the payment of retroactive pension benefits to employees of a
private golf course purchased by the city of Marysville. Under the provisions of the Public Employees'
Retirement System, the city was required to contribute to the retirement fund a service credit for the
employees' previous service at the course. In addition to utilizing its legitimate public purpose
266
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opinion that the court directly reconsidered the threshold issue of whether
the issuance of nonrecourse bonds constituted a loan of state credit.
III. THE WHEFA DECISION
The Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority36 proposed to
issue bonds for the benefit of Seattle University and Pacific Lutheran
University.37 The Authority was to issue the bonds in its own name, then
create a trust fund from the proceeds, and loan the proceeds to the
universities. 38
Numerous features of the plan specified that no state liability could be
incurred. Both the trust indentures and the bonds were to bear disclaimers
of any obligation by the State or the Authority. All debt service and costs
would be paid by the universities. No costs would accrue to the State. The
bonds would be secured only by obligation of the universities. The Author-
ity itself receives no money from the State; rather it derives its support from
the benefitted higher education institutions. 39
Two members of the board of the Authority, including the state governor,
refused to sign the resolutions authorizing issuance of the bonds, asserting
doubts as to their constitutionality under article 8, section 5. The Authority
brought an action under the original jurisdiction of the state supreme court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the nonsigning members of the board to
sign the resolutions.40
After holding that the bond issuance would not violate federal or state
constitutional religious restrictions, 41 the court addressed the issue of
whether this scheme violated the constitutional prohibition against the loan
exception, however, the court muddied its own analysis by also holding that the employees had provided
consideration for the payments, thus removing any donative elements from the transfer. Marysville, 101
Wn. 2d at 58, 676 P.2d at 993. The court thus implied both that section 5 would apply but for the
exception, and that section 5 did not apply because no donative transfer had occurred. See infra note 74.
36. The Authority was created by the Washington Higher Education Facilities Authority-Private
Nonprofit Educational Institutions Act, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 28B.07.010-.920 (1983).
37. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 841, 699 P.2d at 1242.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 841-42, 699 P.2d at 1242.
41. Id. at 843-44,699 P.2d at 1243. This Note does not focus on the merits of the court's analysis of
the constitutional religious issues involved, but rather addresses only the court's analysis of the
constitutional lending of credit issues. See generally Conklin and Vachd, The Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause of the Washington Constitution-A Proposal to the Supreme Court, 8 U.
Pu"Er SouND L. REv. 411 (1985); Comment, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation
of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REv. 625 (1985).
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of state credit. The court reviewed the prior interpretations of these provi-
sions in the Port of Longview42 and Ray43 opinions and the subsequent
contrary views in the Johnson44 and O'Brien45 opinions. The court then
sidestepped all the prior methods of analysis, in favor of a simpler alter-
native analysis. The court identified four components to section 5, which
must all be satisfied before an action will violate the section: "(1) credit
(2) of the state (3) shall not be given or loaned to or used in aid of (4) any
individual, association, company or corporation. ",46 Since the State did not
expend or provide for future expense of any state money in the WHEFA
scheme, no debt was created, and so the attempt to apply article 8, section 5
failed upon the application of the first component. 47
IV. ANALYSIS
After more than a decade of confusion, the Washington court properly
concluded that nonrecourse bonds do not violate the constitution, thereby
aligning Washington law with virtually every other state with a similar
lending of credit provision. 48 The opinion thus clarified the analysis for
future lending of credit cases in determining what actually constitutes
"credit." The opinion did not specify, however, the proper analysis to be
applied where a loan of credit is found, but implied that the court will look
only to the literal words of the provision to evaluate any future schemes.
Future analysis should not ignore the recent decisions which justifiably
include interpretation of the intent of the framers as an important part of
this area of constitutional analysis. The court should compare proposed
schemes with those intended to be prohibited by the framers, focusing on
the importance of the public purpose served, and the extent of public
control retained over the funds.
A. Effect on Issuance of Nonrecourse Bonds
The reasoning used by the court indicates that the court is now fully
convinced that article 8, section 5 will no longer be used to prohibit
42. 85 Wn. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1974).
43. 93 Wn. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980).
44. 96 Wn. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981).
45. 100 Wn. 2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983).
46. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 847, 699 P.2d at 1245. The court relied on Spitzer, supra note 9, as the
origin of its literalistic treatment of the language of the provisions. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 847, 699
P.2d at 1245.
47. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 847, 699 P.2d of 1245.
48. Id. at 848, 699 P.2d at 1245; Note, State Constitution, supra note 9, at 447-49.
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issuance of nonrecourse bonds.49 For the purpose of determining the
existence of credit, the court was correct to abandon the consideration of
legitimacy of public function, or other unnecessary factors that have arisen
since Port of Longview. Instead, the court properly focused on the narrow
issue of whether any credit was loaned. The court succinctly set forth the
factors which must be considered under the first prong of its definitional
test in ascertaining the existence of a loan,50 and these factors should aid
future courts in similar decisions.
The WHEFA approach to defining credit is more consistent with the
literal terms of the constitution. Prior courts erred in attempting to apply
analysis of purpose and safeguards to the preliminary objective question of
whether any credit at all is involved in the proposed scheme.51 As the court
in an earlier opinion stated, "section 5 should prohibit only those activities
which jeopardize state assets." '52 A determination at the outset that no
credit is present completely eliminates the need to consider section 5 as a
barrier. The history of awkward analysis since Port ofLongview has shown
the conceptual inaccuracies and difficulties of the opposing viewpoint. 53
The court's conclusion also reduces the economic uncertainty caused by
the prior unpredictable treatment of nonrecourse bonds. Permitting wide-
spread use of the nonrecourse bond procedure allows the State to encourage
valuable development at no expense to the State. 54
B. Effect on Other Loan of Credit Schemes
The WHEFA decision implied that the historical intent considerations
that have been used by the court in earlier decisions may now be irrelevant.
49. The court's statement that no violation of sections 5 and 7 occurs where no debt is created
effectively permits all issues of nonrecourse bonds in the future, since the bonds by definition create no
state liablility. See generally Note, State Constitution, supra note 9, at 443-46.
50. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 848,699 P.2d at 1245. Thefactors thecourtreviewedto confirmthatno
state debt was created were:
(1) No money comes from the public treasury.
(2) The bond proceeds never enter the public treasury.
(3) Repayments of the bonds do not pass through the public treasury.
(4) The bonds are not state debts.
(5) Although bond sales are enabled by a public body, the money is not acquired either for or from
the general public.
Id. (citing Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Spellman, 96 Wn. 2d 68, 633 P.2d 866 (1981)).
51. See, e.g., Washington State Housing Fn. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wn. 2d 491,495-98,671
P.2d 247, 250-51 (1983).
52. In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d 255, 267, 634 P.2d 877, 883 (1981).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 15-31.
54. See Reich, supra note 9, at 658-61. Additionally, this use of state tax-exempt status has been
foreseen and encouraged by Congress. Congress permits the use of state tax-exempt bond status for
numerous types of private development projects. See generally Note, State Constitution, supra note 9,
at 443-46.
269
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The court instead indicated that its future analysis would look only to the
literal application of the provision's components. 55 If this approach were
adopted for all future lending of credit questions, it could create serious
shortcomings and lack of needed flexibility in the court's analysis of future
lending of credit schemes.
The court's dissection of the express language of section 5 into its four
components does not provide a fully adequate framework for analysis. The
use of only the four components would require courts to invalidate schemes
merely because some measure of benefit flows from the State to an
"individual, association, company or corporation." ' 56 Courts would be
forced to invalidate schemes which are harmless, or provide significant
public benefits. 57 Literal interpretation of the language of sections 5 and 7
has been used, for example, to invalidate a plan for the state payment of
burial expenses for indigents, 58 a program to distribute energy conservation
materials, 59 and a proposal to donate an old bus to a school for the
retarded. 60
A second effect of the WHEFA decision is that the court, in isolating
only four factors for its analysis of section 5 issues, may have limited the
ability to use provisions from section 7 as aids to its analysis of section
5.61 The separation may have both positive and negative effects. The
analysis of the two provisions would be greatly simplified, thus preventing
the recognizably strained analytical acrobatics that have occurred in such
opinions as Ray62 and O'Brien.63 The separation of the two would also
result in the validity of a greater number of state programs, since section 5
contains fewer prohibitions than section 7. Although the long history of
joint interpretation may make it doubtful that the court will quickly jump
to the separate interpretation of the two sections, the implication of
WHEFA, and the dicta in certain earlier opinions, 64 is that the court may
55. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 847, 699 P.2d at 1245.
56. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
57. See Reich, supra note 9, at 661:
Private benefit is a predictable and often essential attribute of public programs undertaken
primarily to serve public purposes. The fact that a private entity may receive some benefit from the
legitimate exercise of the legislative authority should not necessarily implicate the constitutional
prohibitions against the lending of public credit.
58. Washington v. Guaranty Trust Co., 20 Wn. 2d 588, 148 P.2d 323 (1944).
59. 1978 Opinion Att'y Gen. No. 13, at 4.
60. City of Seattle Opinion No. 5249 (1967). See C. KIPPEN, supra note 9, at V-2 to V-10, for an
extensive list of programs found constitutionally invalid.
61. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
62. 93 Wn. 2d 108, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980).
63. 100 Wn. 2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983). The confusion brought about by the treatment of the two
differing provisions as identical has been acknowledged. See, e.g., Washington Health Care Facilities
Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wn. 2d 108, 116-17, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980) (Dolliver, J., concurring).
64. In In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d 255,262,634 P.2d 877, 881(1981), the court appeared
270
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begin to attribute significance to the differences in wording between the
two sections.
The negative result of such an approach, however, would be that conduct
which the constitutional framers may have actually intended to prohibit, for
example, direct gifts by the State to private individuals, may no longer
come under the prohibitions of section 5. Under the terms of section 5, only
lending or giving of credit is prohibited, with prohibitions against gifts of
money or property added only through the traditional interpolation of
section 7 into section 5. 65 The intent of the framers was to prohibit all
gifts ,66 but if the two provisions are separated, section 5 would provide only
limited prohibitions against gifts. Until such time as the court resolves this
issue, cautious litigants using section 5 cannot assume that the prohibitions
and exceptions of section 7 automatically apply to state conduct regulated
under section 5.
V. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF LENDING OF
CREDIT SCHEMES
A possible approach to future section 5 analysis involves the use of a six-
step framework that would provide adequate consideration to both the letter
and the intent of the constitution. 67 Four of the factors are those identified
by the WHEFA court in its dissection of the language of section 5. First, the
court should consider the nature of the res transferred, or "simply [ask]
whether the bonding scheme constitutes creation of a public debt
(credit).- 68 Second, the court should consider the nature of the party
making the transfer, since the language of section 5 requires that the credit
loaned be that of the State itself.69 Third, consideration should be given to
the nature of the exchange, i.e., whether it is a gift, a loan, or a bargained
exchange supported by consideration, corresponding to the "shall not in
to retract from its earlier interpolation of section 7 language into section 5. The court identified a "poor
and infirm" exception from section 5, but rather than treating it as an interpolation from section 7, the
court merely stated, "[a]id to the poor and infirm is one example of a governmental function, and hence
it has been excepted from the section 5 prohibition. "Id. Thus, the court separated the exception from its
origins in section 7, thereby indicating that the two sections need not be interpreted together. See
Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wn. 2d 108, 115, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980);
Morgan v. Department of Social Sec., 14 Wn. 2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
65. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
66. During the Washington constitutional convention, one delegate moved to amend section 5 to
cover donations. The motion lost, with two members expressing their opinion that the words "in any
manner be given" would be sufficient. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION 1889, at 675 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
67. C. KIPPEN, supra note 9, at 1-19.
68. WHEFA, 103 Wn. 2d at 846, 699 P.2d at 1245.
69. Id. at 847, 699 P.2d at 1245; C. KIPPEN, supra note 9, at 1-19.
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any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of" clause of section 5.70 The
fourth factor to be considered is the nature of the party receiving the
transfer, i.e., whether the recipient is an "individual, association, company
or corporation. "71
The final two factors do not correspond to any express language in
section 5, or even section 7. Courts have, however, considered these factors
in the past. 72 The court must consider the nature of the purpose to be served
by the scheme and whether that scheme serves a sufficiently important
purpose to counterbalance any private benefit that might be involved. 73
Public purpose must be considered as a factor able to override private
benefit, since every expenditure of or risk to public funds will always
provide some quantum of benefit to private entities. 74
Finally, as a sixth factor, the court should consider whether the scheme
includes sufficient controls upon the res in the recipient's hands to mini-
mize the risk of loss of public funds. 75 These two factors, importance of
public purpose and extent of public control, should be considered in
tandem-a strong showing of public purpose could satisfy the test, even
though retained controls were weak, or very stringent supervisory controls
could make up for a less than compelling public purpose. In fact, this is the
method by which the court has appeared to utilize these factors. 76 These
final two factors should serve to bridge the gap between the overbroad
70. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
71. Id.
72. City of Marysville v. State, 101 Wn. 2d 50, 57-58, 676 P.2d 989,993-94 (1984); Washington
State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wn. 2d 491, 497-99, 671 P.2d 247, 250-52 (1983); In re
Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877 (1981); see supra notes 1-35 and accompanying
text.
73. See Reich, supra note 9, at 651-52: "The purpose of government is to serve a 'public' which is
comprised of 'private' persons, many of whom are neither poor nor infirm. Whenever a municipality
constructs a road, sewer or water system, it provides benefit to private parties."
74. Id. at 661; see supra note 57.
This overt analysis of public purpose is preferable to the contrived methods of analysis which have
been used. For example, some courts have treated fulfillment of a significant public purpose as
constituting a substitute for consideration, removing the scheme from the definition of "gift." See, e.g.,
O'Brien, 100 Wn. 2d at 497, 671 P.2d at 251 ("state aid to a circumscribed class of the public, in
furtherance of legitimate state objectives, may provide the necessary 'consideration' for the aid");
Johnson, 96 Wn. 2d at 262, 634 P.2d at 881 ("[t]he public benefit achieved from such activities is the
'consideration' for the funds expended"). Using public purpose as a substitute for consideration has a
major analytical weakness, since traditional contract law principles do not allow a court to review the
adequacy of consideration. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-3, at 136 (1977). If even a
remote or insignificant public benefit were present, the court would be forced to find consideration that
would remove the scheme from section 5. This would clearly be contrary to the intent of the framers of
this section, since even the railroad schemes which the section was designed to prohibit provided some
measure of public benefit by providing improved transportation facilities.
75. C. KIPPEN, supra note 9, at 1-19.
76. See supra note 72 and cases cited therein.
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prohibitions of the section and the specific goals of the framers in shaping
the section. 77
The WHEFA court was correct not to consider these factors in deciding
the threshold question of whether there was an actual loan involved, but the
court should include these factors later in its analysis of the constitu-
tionality of future schemes. Consideration of these factors is necessary in
order to give full effect to the policies underlying the provisions without
unduly restricting or expanding the range of permissible schemes under
section 5. Use of the literal language of the provisions alone necessarily
leads to the rejection of desirable schemes that utilize loans of credit in
ways that would have been acceptable to the constitutional framers. 78 Overt
consideration of these factors serves to bring the court's implicit analysis of
policy into the open and provide predictable standards for determining
which programs will be acceptable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court's simplified, literal analysis of section 5 suited its purpose in
deciding that nonrecourse bonds are not constitutionally prohibited. But
future opinions must look beyond the literal language to give due consid-
eration to the historical intent behind the provision. A careful application of
the literal requirements of the language of the section, tempered by consid-
eration of historical intent and the extenuating circumstances of substantial
public purpose and retention of public control of the funds, will both clarify
the analysis in this long-muddied area and fulfill the letter and the underly-
ing policy of the constitution.
Carol Sue Hunting
77. See supra notes 11-12, 57-60 and accompanying text.
78. As one commentator wrote, "[t]he fact that a contractor earns a profit by constructing a public
jail does not render the project unconstitutional." Reich, supra note 9, at 659.
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